Subject: GA-DIGEST V1 #289
From: [email-masked] (GA-DIGEST)
To: [email-masked]

GA-DIGEST            Sunday, March 18 2001            Volume 01 : Number 289

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: Sat, 17 Mar 2001 15:21:27 -0800
From: "William X. Walsh" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re[2]: [ga] Draft Resolution

Hello Kent,

Saturday, March 17, 2001, 9:44:26 AM, Kent Crispin wrote:

> William Walsh has pressed me to come up with what advantages I see with
> the new proposals.  There is no mystery: The advantages have actually
> all been stated: splitting off of .net and .org, cleaner contracts,
> various monetary committments, and so on.  These are clear and obvious
> advantages.  

Sorry, Kent, but this doesn't wash.

Please, spell out the benefits of net and org being spun off, please
point out the flaws in the old contract and the benefits to the
internet community in the new contract provisions that address those
flaws (if they exist), etc.

You state something is an advantage, when it is NOT clear and obvious
that those are advantages.

Please back that statement up with some facts.

- -- 
Best regards,
 William                            mailto:[email-masked]

- --
This message was passed to you via the [email-masked] list.
Send mail to [email-masked] to unsubscribe
("unsubscribe ga" in the body of the message).
Archives at http://www.dnso.org/archives.html

------------------------------

Date: Sat, 17 Mar 2001 15:23:27 -0800
From: "William X. Walsh" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: [ga] Mime-Version: 1.0

Hello Jefsey,

Saturday, March 17, 2001, 10:32:11 AM, Jefsey Morfin wrote:

> I nominate
> -  Danny Younger e-mail: [email-masked] for Chair
> -  Patrick Corliss  e-mail: [email-masked] for co-Chair

Jefsey, there is not two separate nomination processes for the Chair
and Co-Chair.

The Co-Chair is elected in a separate second election from the
unelected candidates for Chair.

Therefore, if you want Patrick to be considered for either position,
you should nominate him for Chair.

- -- 
Best regards,
 William                            mailto:[email-masked]

- --
This message was passed to you via the [email-masked] list.
Send mail to [email-masked] to unsubscribe
("unsubscribe ga" in the body of the message).
Archives at http://www.dnso.org/archives.html

------------------------------

Date: Sun, 18 Mar 2001 11:35:03 +1100
From: "Dassa" <[email-masked]>
Subject: RE: [ga] Draft Resolution

|> -----Original Message-----
|> From: On Behalf Of Kent Crispin
|> Sent: Sunday, 18 March 2001 4:44 AM
|> Subject: Re: [ga] Draft Resolution
|>
|>
|> On Sat, Mar 17, 2001 at 06:20:07PM +1300, DPF wrote:
|> > DRAFT RESOLUTION
|> [...]
|> >
|> > Specific concerns the general assembly has regarding the proposed
|> > contract are:
|> >
|> >
|> > - The granting of a presumptive right to be the *.com registry to
|> > Verisign.  By lowering the necessary performance standard to retain
|> > *.com *which makes up 65% of all domain names in the world), this
|> > removes a huge pressure on the registry to keep prices as low as
|> > possible and to have the best possible relationship with Registrars
|>
|> "huge"? I doubt that very seriously.  While people complain about the
|> lack of effectiveness of TLD vs TLD competition, the effectiveness of
|> serial competition is equally questionable, at least as things are
|> currently constructed.  [+] (see note on "serial competition", below)

I do not want to see TLD vs TLD competition.  I see the Registries as being a
fundamental resource for the Internet community and would like to see them
operated by non-commercial interests under strict guidelines developed by ICANN
and the Internet community.  Competition should only need to be introduced at
the Registrar level where the consumers are.  There needs to be better control
of the infrastructure.  This is an ideal we should be attempting to work towards
now so when the opportunity arises to make the change it will be possible.

<snip>

|> > - The possibility of a change to the status of *.org registration
|>
|> 1) There is a possibility of that, regardless.  In any case, the registry
|> operator is bound to abide by "consensus policies".
|>
|> 2) Given the complexity of the process we have seen in getting new gTLD
|> operators in place, it is inconceivable that a new operator/policy for
|> .org would be put in place without a long-drawn out public process.

As it should be.  Changing the accepted policy of a TLD will require ICANN to
listen to the DNSO and other SO's.

|> > - Granting the ability to Verisign to increase registry prices with
|> > only 30 days notice
|>
|> But there are price caps, as I recall.  Price caps are the only thing
|> that matters, in fact, because if some other company wins the rebid,
|> they win a monopoly for 4 years (or whatever the term might be) in any
|> case, and can immediately reset the prices. (* "serial competition", below)

My understanding was that the price caps would be removed under the new
agreement.

|> > - The ambiguity over what the $200 million to be invested in registry
|> > development would actually be, and the lack of any clear process to
|> > audit this.
|>
|> Reasonable point.

The two amounts quoted within the new agreement do not mean squat to me.  They
appear to be sweeteners designed to divert attention from the important issues.
The $200 million for R&D especially.  Without having a clear budget assigned to
the funding it is conceivable the money would be spent without any benefit to
the Internet community.  The $5 million assigned to assist with the Registry
handling .org is of interest but I can not see any reason why extra
consideration be given to this aspect.  I'm sure any organisation that was
developed to handle the .org Registry would be able to find funding for
activities.

|> > - The non-transparent process used to negotiate these agreements which
|> > are then presented as not negotiable to the ICANN Board and DNSO
|>
|> If a negotiating partner insists on secrecy, one is put in an awkward
|> position.  In any case, what does this have to do with the merits of the
|> proposals?

Actually, it can have a great deal to do with how such proposals are viewed.
Secrecy should not be acceptable to ICANN when policy is concerned.  There is
also the matter of trust.  As with most things, the community needs to see
procedure in practice, not just discussed.  In this instance we have seen the
correct procedures not being followed.  This has the tendency to make the
community distrustful and anxious about proposals dealt with in such a manner.

<snip>

|> > - The total lack of outside analysis on whether the proposed changes
|> > will be beneficial to the Internet community
|>
|> A valid concern.  Not clear how that could have been done, though.  This
|> was an exploratory private negotiation, at the behest of NSI, and NSI
|> played the deadlines in the way it thought was most advantageous.  In
|> retrospect, that may have been a mistake on their part.
|>
|> William Walsh has pressed me to come up with what advantages I see with
|> the new proposals.  There is no mystery: The advantages have actually
|> all been stated: splitting off of .net and .org, cleaner contracts,
|> various monetary committments, and so on.  These are clear and obvious
|> advantages.

Although I can see advantages in the long term to split off the TLD's, in this
instance and in the short term I can not see any advantages to the Internet
community.  If anything, I see disadvantages in the short term due to adding
complexity and the disruption caused by the split.  For any advantages to be
considered there would need to be a concise and fully developed policy on the
handling of all the TLD's and Registries.  I haven't seen such a policy as yet.

Cleaner contracts is an ambivious term.  Accepted the contracts may be an
improvement, however, it is not proven they are the most advantageous for the
general community.

The monetary committements are of limited advantage to the community.

I would say these are not clear and obvious advantages.

<snip>

Darryl (Dassa) Lynch.

- --
This message was passed to you via the [email-masked] list.
Send mail to [email-masked] to unsubscribe
("unsubscribe ga" in the body of the message).
Archives at http://www.dnso.org/archives.html

------------------------------

Date: Sun, 18 Mar 2001 01:51:59 +0100
From: Jefsey Morfin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: [ga] Draft Resolution

Dear Kent,
I see that you have rewritten the history to your convenience. This is
acceptable since you promote the idea that the iCANN/VeriSign are
together acting for the best of the Internet Community.

On 18:44 17/03/01, Kent Crispin said:
> > - Verisign would be in a position where it could purchase other
> > Registrars thus once again gaining over 50% or even 75% of the
> > registrar market in *.com, as well as the registry.
>
>Big "So what".  Any large company can do this; it is independent of the
>issue of the registrar/registry split.

But this one I do not undrstand: if a registry cannot be a registrar
I hardly see how any "big" or "small" company could be both (through
affliates) registry and registrar.

Jefsey

BTW I thank you for your demonstration: my main point is to
show that iCANN and VeriSign are trying to become our nice
Big Brother making us happy against our poor inability to rule
our own business. This is exactly what you descibe in your
fairy tale.

- --
This message was passed to you via the [email-masked] list.
Send mail to [email-masked] to unsubscribe
("unsubscribe ga" in the body of the message).
Archives at http://www.dnso.org/archives.html

------------------------------

Date: Sun, 18 Mar 2001 01:51:31 +0100
From: Jefsey Morfin <[email-masked]>
Subject: [ga] Re: [wg-review] DNSO recommendations

Dear Sandy,
my target was only to draft some outlines and to
help discussion. But ...

On 19:28 17/03/01, Sandy Harris said:
>Jefsey Morfin wrote:
>
> > The DNSO model I support is rather simple and not
> > so different from the existing one - once the voting
> > aspects have been changed.
> >
> > 1. The DNSO is to be a Consultant to the BoD on DN issues.
>
>My understanding is that the current bylaws make the DNSO the
>body with primary responsibility for making policy in this area.
>           ****************************************

This is not the role of a support organization. The bylaws
dont tell that the way I read them (I had an argument about
this with Karl Auerbach as he was *wishing* the things to be
the way you think they are)

Actually what is the target and the possibilities?

a) that nothing concerning DNs is decided without
     prior review and comment by the DNSO.  This
     exactly the purpose of a separate statement
     of mine in the model.

b) that this pretence is not denied to the DNSO on
     the ground that DNSO has no legitimacy and no
     serious staffing. This is why the DNSO (as support
     organization) cannot be in line. It cannot negotiate
     with VeriSign. It should act as a Parliament with a
     defacto veto power through the seriousness of its
     reports and work.

>I object strongly to the notion of formally reducing it to a
>consulting role. Of course I know that it has already effectively
>been reduced to that. I object to that as well.

No you do not object to that. You object to the fact that
this role is not acknowledged and that to date the DNSO
has never been able to do its job ... :-) at least this is
the way I read you.

We cannot claim for having a monopoly on a job we
should do and never did. The task of this WG-R is
to propose pragmatic solutions. We cannot control
the world, but we can control the way the BoD wants
to control it.

> > Only DN holders should be allowed as members.
>Absurd.

The DNSO is to talk about DN with
competence. The situation has drastically changed
from two years ago. I hardy see someone in this
WG-Review not owning a DN or not belonging to the
staff of an organization owning a DN. Namezero makes
them free... Today someone wanting to discuss DN
issues seriously and not owning a DN does not look
serious to me. With an exception may be (Jeff
Williams) and I suppose that actually Jeff owns a
few of them but wants to show he represents non
domain name owners as well.

These people are Internet stakeholders and are now
represented through @large.

This being said I will not make that point a big issue.
But DNSO has to ascertain itself as a center
of competence. All the existing constituencies are
based upon DN ownership/direct interest. The IDNH
would also be DN holders....

>many people other than domain holders have an interest in seeing
>the system work well.
>
>Granted, if there's a constituency structure then domain name
>holders must have a constituency. Methinks the public interest
>groups -- EFF et al -- should have one too, and those two
>constituencies together should have a majority of NC votes.

This would be a totally different model. I claim that DNSO is to
work by consensus and not by vote. There is just some
administrative matters such as selection of three competent
people for the BoD which require votes.

Please remember: DNSO is *no more* the @large
repository. It is an SO dedicated to DN oriented matters.

Take care.
Jefsey

>--
>This message was passed to you via the [email-masked] list.
>Send mail to [email-masked] to unsubscribe
>("unsubscribe wg-review" in the body of the message).
>Archives at http://www.dnso.org/archives.html

- --
This message was passed to you via the [email-masked] list.
Send mail to [email-masked] to unsubscribe
("unsubscribe ga" in the body of the message).
Archives at http://www.dnso.org/archives.html

------------------------------

Date: Sat, 17 Mar 2001 17:00:08 -0800
From: Kent Crispin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: [ga] Draft Resolution

On Sun, Mar 18, 2001 at 11:35:03AM +1100, Dassa wrote:
> I do not want to see TLD vs TLD competition.  I see the Registries as
> being a fundamental resource for the Internet community and would like
> to see them operated by non-commercial interests under strict guidelines
> developed by ICANN and the Internet community.  Competition should only
> need to be introduced at the Registrar level where the consumers are. 

Interestingly enough, I and many other people also felt this way. 
Unfortunately, that battle was fought and lost long ago. 

- -- 
Kent Crispin                               "Be good, and you will be
[email-masked]                           lonesome." -- Mark Twain
- --
This message was passed to you via the [email-masked] list.
Send mail to [email-masked] to unsubscribe
("unsubscribe ga" in the body of the message).
Archives at http://www.dnso.org/archives.html

------------------------------

Date: Sat, 17 Mar 2001 17:40:00 -0800
From: "William X. Walsh" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re[2]: [ga] Draft Resolution

Hello Dassa,

Saturday, March 17, 2001, 4:35:03 PM, Dassa wrote:
> I do not want to see TLD vs TLD competition.  I see the Registries as being a
> fundamental resource for the Internet community and would like to see them
> operated by non-commercial interests under strict guidelines developed by ICANN
> and the Internet community.  Competition should only need to be introduced at
> the Registrar level where the consumers are.  There needs to be better control
> of the infrastructure.  This is an ideal we should be attempting to work towards
> now so when the opportunity arises to make the change it will be possible.

I don't agree.  Non-competitive systems tend to lead to higher prices
and costs, and less efficiency.

The domain industry is just that, an industry.  It needs to be guided
by the same types of influences other businesses do, and that includes
competitive forces.

With out the competitive factor, there is no driving force for
innovation and development that lead to lower costs and thus lower
prices, and other factors.

- -- 
Best regards,
 William                            mailto:[email-masked]

- --
This message was passed to you via the [email-masked] list.
Send mail to [email-masked] to unsubscribe
("unsubscribe ga" in the body of the message).
Archives at http://www.dnso.org/archives.html

------------------------------

Date: Sun, 18 Mar 2001 10:53:09 +1200
From: DPF <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: [ga] Draft Resolution

On Sat, 17 Mar 2001 09:44:26 -0800, Kent Crispin wrote:
>On Sat, Mar 17, 2001 at 06:20:07PM +1300, DPF wrote:

>> - The granting of a presumptive right to be the *.com registry to
>> Verisign.  By lowering the necessary performance standard to retain
>> *.com *which makes up 65% of all domain names in the world), this
>> removes a huge pressure on the registry to keep prices as low as
>> possible and to have the best possible relationship with Registrars
>
>"huge"? I doubt that very seriously.  While people complain about the
>lack of effectiveness of TLD vs TLD competition, the effectiveness of
>serial competition is equally questionable, at least as things are 
>currently constructed.  [+] (see note on "serial competition", below)

Firstly thanks Kent for providing your views, even if of course we do
not agree on many of them.

I've thought about this some more and I have to say I am more
convinced than ever that "huge"is indeed appropriate.  By 2007 the
registry side of *.com alone could well exceed US$1 billion - an
amount which could see several quite large companies decide to put in
exceedingly competitive bids for.  Verisign as an intelligent company
is not going to ignore this possibility and rely on lawsuits to keep
the registry (uncertain and expensive) but with no registrar business
will be especially keen to keep the registry by performing to a
standard (minimal complaints from registrars, lower prices etc) that
is untouchable.

>> - Allowing Verisign to retain its registrar business puts in place
>> perverse anti-competitive incentives regardless of organisational
>> firewalls. 
>
>Whether the incentives are "perverse" is surely an extreme value
>judgement.  

It is a value judgement, which is of course what an opinion is all
about.  I don't think it is extreme.  It is common sense that if you
own one of your customers but not all the others there is an incentive
to look after the one you own (especially if you have a presumptive
right to keep the registry).

>Clearly incentives exist -- they always exist, but the
>mechanism of organizational firewalls is deemed sufficient in many
>anti-trust circumstances, and if you are going to claim that they are 
>not sufficient in this one, you should document it.

On the contrary the onus is on Verisign to document that they are
sufficient.  Plus at present they *may* be sufficient because the
contract is for Verisign to only have a registrar business until 18
May.  Once that is no longer the case then the incentives change and
what was sufficient may be no longer.  I believe the increased risk is
enough to want to avoid it.  Verisign may be the nicest guys in the
world (yet managements change) but why put in place a regime which
will place anti-competitive incentives in front of them, especially
when one already has an agreement to get rid of them.

>> - Verisign would be in a position where it could purchase other
>> Registrars thus once again gaining over 50% or even 75% of the
>> registrar market in *.com, as well as the registry.
>
>Big "So what".  Any large company can do this; it is independent of the 
>issue of the registrar/registry split.  See the below discussion on the 
>"zero wholesale cost" argument.

The argument used by the ICANN staff is that they are now below 50% of
the registrar market.  The point is they can easily change that
overnight if they are allowed to by the proposed changes.  And having
the registry also does give them an advantage.

>> - The possibility of a change to the status of *.org registration
>
>1) There is a possibility of that, regardless.  In any case, the registry 
>operator is bound to abide by "consensus policies".

Well according to ICANN staff/website we only have one - the UDRP.
Absolutely everything else is a contractual matter it seems.  There
have obviously been discussions between Verisign and ICANN staff on
this issue and it is obvious that if the proposed changes are agreed
to it is far more likely that the status of *.org will change.

>2) Given the complexity of the process we have seen in getting new gTLD 
>operators in place, it is inconceivable that a new operator/policy for 
>.org would be put in place without a long-drawn out public process.

Really - I would say it is conceivable that the staff will announce a
draft contract with a new registry and give people only a few weeks to
comment on it and claim that it is a contractual matter which does not
need DNSO approval.  Just as they have done this time.

>> - Granting the ability to Verisign to increase registry prices with
>> only 30 days notice
>
>But there are price caps, as I recall.  Price caps are the only thing
>that matters, in fact, because if some other company wins the rebid,
>they win a monopoly for 4 years (or whatever the term might be) in any
>case, and can immediately reset the prices. (* "serial competition", below)

What are the price caps?  The Registrars can't seem to find them.  

>> - The ambiguity over what the $200 million to be invested in registry
>> development would actually be, and the lack of any clear process to
>> audit this.  
>
>Reasonable point.

We agree on something - I think I will pour myself a whiskey to
celebrate :-)

>> - The non-transparent process used to negotiate these agreements which
>> are then presented as not negotiable to the ICANN Board and DNSO
>
>If a negotiating partner insists on secrecy, one is put in an awkward
>position.  In any case, what does this have to do with the merits of the
>proposals?

One insists upon being able to inform your Board in confidence of the
negotiations and to gain from them a negotiating framework.  If
Verisign do not agree to this then one implements existing ICANN
policy.

And the process does interact with the merits.  The fact that we do
not know all the answers to our questions is a reflection of the
process used.  The fact that we are unable to suggest even minor
improvements to the proposals is an impediment.  If one could then one
might be able to endorse the proposals in principle as long as some
minor changes are made.

>> - The detrimental effects on registrars who have become registrars and
>> invested money on the basis of the existing contract (which mandates
>> the Verisign registry must divest the registrar business)
>
>Reasonable point.  Certainly, if I were starting a registrar, this 
>would have been something I would considered.

Possibly one of the strongest from the Registrar point of view.

>> - The unfair advantage the Verisign Registrar would gain by being able
>> to sell domains with a zero wholesale cost, thus potentially forcing
>> out many smaller competitors
>
>It pains me to say this, since some of my good friends are in the
>registrar business, but the "zero wholesale cost" argument is bogus.  
>See discussion [++] below.

I disagree but will respond fully down below.

>> - The total lack of outside analysis on whether the proposed changes
>> will be beneficial to the Internet community
>
>A valid concern.  Not clear how that could have been done, though.  This
>was an exploratory private negotiation, at the behest of NSI, and NSI
>played the deadlines in the way it thought was most advantageous.  In 
>retrospect, that may have been a mistake on their part.

Indeed.  If NSI won't agree to ICANN having time to get expert outside
opinion on the benefits (or otherwise) to the Internet community, then
they increase their chance of rejection.  

>William Walsh has pressed me to come up with what advantages I see with
>the new proposals.  There is no mystery: The advantages have actually
>all been stated: splitting off of .net and .org, cleaner contracts,
>various monetary committments, and so on.  These are clear and obvious
>advantages.  

And I agree with these.  There are good points to the contracts.
However in my opinion the bad points far outweigh these.  The
combination of the presumptive right to *.com and keeping the
registrar business could lead to a return to the bad old days.

>The argument has actually mostly revolved around the significance of the
>*disadvantages*, and they are in fact, very difficult to evaluate.  

Yes to some degree they are.  And unless one can be assured about them
the safer course is the status quo.  There we know exactly what we are
getting warts and all.

>If, on the other hand, you believe that competition between gTLDs is not
>going to be effective, and that .com will forever be the only important
>player, then it is very important to constrain the power of that
>registry as much as possible.  Of course, it would be nice if we could
>have both, but that option isn't available.

There will be some serial competition - especially amongst large
businesses who will want all suffixes.  But I think *.com will remain
the king amongst princes so to speak for a long long time.  Not just
the head start they have but also even the media talk about dot coms.

As I have said before I would be far less worried about this proposal
if the new gTLDs had been up and operating even six months or so.
That may give us some idea.

>The question is: 6 years from now, will we see .com as a much reduced
>player, with .org, .biz, .net, .info, and a bunch of other new domains
>getting most of the new registrations, or will .com remain the elephant
>in the land of mice?

Until we have some facts on which to decide this, we should play it
safe and keep the status quo.  The harm from getting it wrong may be
large.

>If the latter, then NSI will have won, regardless, and under either
>scenario will fight incredibly hard to keep .com.  

However they will be the registry only getting $6 per name only.  If
we allow them to stay Registrar only and they get an additional $29
per name and by 2007 this may be an additional $1.5 billion of annual
revenues on current market share.  That is a huge gift to a company.

>Anyone who has been
>involved in this for any length of time knows just how effective they
>can be, and personally, I think that the threat of a rebid is a pipe
>dream.  The current contract gives them *plenty* of ammunition.

I think under the current contract Verisign would be fools to rely on
legal action to keep the registry in 2007.  They would rely on great
performance and low prices which is what we want. It is all a matter
of incentives and the status quo will give Verisign good incentives to
perform well as a registry while the proposals will give them
anti-competitive incentives 

>In sum, I believe that the course we are on *requires* that we make 
>registry competition work.  If we don't, we have lost everything.

We lose IMO far more if *.com remains dominant and Verisign is a
Registrar as well as registry and also has a presumptive right to
keeping the registry.

>[+] Note on "Serial competition": The basic problem is that, as things are
>currently, a reasonable rebid cycle would be on the order of 4 years or
>more (since the switching costs involved the change of registry operator
>are sgnificant -- significant for the registry operator, significant for
>the Internet comunity).  

How are they significant for the Internet community?  All you have to
do is update Root Server A with the new delegation for *.com.  No need
for the interface to change.

>No matter who wins the rebid, they will be
>given a monopoly for the term, and a lot of monopoly advantage can be
>exploited in 4 years.  That is, there is no reason to expect that the 
>winner of the bid will be any better than NSI.

This is not about whether NSI are now good or bad guys.  It is about
allowing any company to be a registry and registrar in *.com is a bad
idea, especially combined with a presumptive right to keep *.com for
ever.

>The only way that serial competition can be made to work is if the
>switching costs are quite low.  I described such a model in "Position
>Paper D" in the report of WG C
>(http://www.dnso.org/dnso/notes/19991023.NCwgc-report.html), and I
>encourage everyone to read it, since it is a beautiful proposal. 

You are so modest :-)

I've had a read.  It certainly has some merits but I imagine was seen
as too radical a departure from the status quo.

>[++] The "Zero wholesale cost" argument is bogus, because it neglects
>the other side of the equation: "zero wholesale profit".  To see this,
>suppose that the NSI registrar, in a fit of monopolistic greed for
>market share, decided to leverage it's supposed "zero wholesale cost" to
>the max, and to give away registrations for free.  In such a case, every
>registration by the NSI registrar would be $6 lost in fees that would
>have been collected from any other registrar.  This is a real loss for
>the registry. 

I agree it is not economic sense for Verisign to have its registrar
give away registrations for zero dollars.  However let's look at what
happens if Verisign the Registrar decides to sell registrations for
say $6.

First of all no other registrar would be able to sell at that price
because it would give them a zero margin to pay their staff and costs.
They would go bankrupt if they tried to see at zero dollars.

Now Verisign the Registrar would lose money on the $6 sale fees but
Verisign the Registry would make money ($6 less costs) and if the
combined costs of Registry and Registrar are less than $6 then
Verisign overall makes money, increases market share and bankrupts the
competition.

>It is perhaps unfortunate, but the fact is that *any* large company
>enjoys precisely the same advantage that Verisign does, and the
>inescapable conclusion is that small registrars are not going to make it
>in the long run, regardless.  This is completely independent of any
>issue of registry/registrar split.  

Disagree.  As shown above allowing any company to keep both the
registry and a registrar will allow it to set retail prices at a level
where they are the only company which can make money.

DPF
- --
[email-masked]
ICQ 29964527
- --
This message was passed to you via the [email-masked] list.
Send mail to [email-masked] to unsubscribe
("unsubscribe ga" in the body of the message).
Archives at http://www.dnso.org/archives.html

------------------------------

Date: Sun, 18 Mar 2001 14:22:07 +1200
From: Joop Teernstra <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: [ga] Mime-Version: 1.0

At 15:23 17/03/01 -0800, William X. Walsh wrote:
>Hello Jefsey,
>
>Saturday, March 17, 2001, 10:32:11 AM, Jefsey Morfin wrote:
>
>> I nominate
>> -  Danny Younger e-mail: [email-masked] for Chair
>> -  Patrick Corliss  e-mail: [email-masked] for co-Chair
>
>Jefsey, there is not two separate nomination processes for the Chair
>and Co-Chair.
>
>The Co-Chair is elected in a separate second election from the
>unelected candidates for Chair.
>
>Therefore, if you want Patrick to be considered for either position,
>you should nominate him for Chair.
>

The candidates could make their acceptance conditional to being voted for
as part of a ticket.
Any other nominee can do this as well. (I accept the nomination, if people
will vote for me as part of a Younger/Corliss ticket)

There appears to be a general lack of will to discuss the current election
rules, but in this way the candidates can create a ticket based approach
themselves.
If the voters do not like it, they will not vote for them. 

Personally, I think that a ticket based approach is to the benefit of
effective  GA Chairing and it is a pity that we do not have the time to
discuss amending the election rules to achieve a better approach.

- --Joop--
Former bootstrap of the CA/idno
       The Polling Booth 
www.democracy.org.nz/vote1/

- --
This message was passed to you via the [email-masked] list.
Send mail to [email-masked] to unsubscribe
("unsubscribe ga" in the body of the message).
Archives at http://www.dnso.org/archives.html

------------------------------

Date: Sun, 18 Mar 2001 14:50:48 +1200
From: Joop Teernstra <[email-masked]>
Subject: [ga] Verisign Poll up in the Booth

for some reason this message did not make it to the list:

GA members,

As promised, I have provided an unofficial tool to measure the consensus
or absence of consensus on the options open to the Board on the Verisign deal.

I have followed both the consensus formulations of Jon Weinberg and the
three option formulation, advocated by myself and David Farrar.
The last option is conditional  to an "

"In case it would be possible for ICANN to renegotiate the Verisign deal....."

The Booth should stay open for a week to collect as many opinions as possible.
The results are visible as they come in.

Please use the comment line to express the reason for your vote.
It would be much appreciated if those who already answered the straw poll
with reasoned comment, would further summarize these comments in the Booth
Archive.

No password is needed to see these Polling Items in the Booth.

- --joop 

The Polling Booth
http://www.democracy.org.nz/vote1/

- --
This message was passed to you via the [email-masked] list.
Send mail to [email-masked] to unsubscribe
("unsubscribe ga" in the body of the message).
Archives at http://www.dnso.org/archives.html

------------------------------

Date: Sun, 18 Mar 2001 02:42:11 +0100
From: Jefsey Morfin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: [ga] Mime-Version: 1.0

Dear WXW,
I though an average brain would understand that I nominate both of them 
with the intent that people vote for Danny first and for Patrick afterward. 
As you may have noticed nominations are public what permits to do some 
campaigning. I am sure you have nothing against that?

Actualy I would like to promote this way of nominating them, so Danny and 
Patrick are defacto elected with a clear mandate.

Jefsey

On 00:23 18/03/01, William X. Walsh said:
>Hello Jefsey,
>
>Saturday, March 17, 2001, 10:32:11 AM, Jefsey Morfin wrote:
>
> > I nominate
> > -  Danny Younger e-mail: [email-masked] for Chair
> > -  Patrick Corliss  e-mail: [email-masked] for co-Chair
>
>Jefsey, there is not two separate nomination processes for the Chair
>and Co-Chair.
>
>The Co-Chair is elected in a separate second election from the
>unelected candidates for Chair.
>
>Therefore, if you want Patrick to be considered for either position,
>you should nominate him for Chair.
>
>--
>Best regards,
>  William                            mailto:[email-masked]

- --
This message was passed to you via the [email-masked] list.
Send mail to [email-masked] to unsubscribe
("unsubscribe ga" in the body of the message).
Archives at http://www.dnso.org/archives.html

------------------------------

Date: Sun, 18 Mar 2001 13:23:28 +1200
From: Joop Teernstra <[email-masked]>
Subject: [ga] Verisign Poll up in the Booth

GA members,

As promised, I have provided an unofficial tool to measure the consensus
or absence of consensus on the options open to the Board on the Verisign deal.

I have followed both the consensus formulations of Jon Weinberg and the
three option formulation, advocated by myself and David Farrar.
The last option is conditional  to an "

"In case it would be possible for ICANN to renegotiate the Verisign deal....."

The Booth should stay open for a week to collect as many opinions as possible.
The results are visible as they come in.

Please use the comment line to express the reason for your vote.
It would be much appreciated if those who already answered the straw poll
with reasoned comment, would further summarize these comments in the Booth
Archive.

No password is needed to see these Polling Items in the Booth.

- --joop 

The Polling Booth
http://www.democracy.org.nz/vote1/

- --
This message was passed to you via the [email-masked] list.
Send mail to [email-masked] to unsubscribe
("unsubscribe ga" in the body of the message).
Archives at http://www.dnso.org/archives.html

------------------------------

Date: Sun, 18 Mar 2001 12:40:05 +1100
From: "Dassa" <[email-masked]>
Subject: RE: [ga] Draft Resolution

|> -----Original Message-----
|> From: On Behalf Of Cade,Marilyn S - LGA
|> Sent: Sunday, 18 March 2001 8:36 AM
|> Subject: RE: [ga] Draft Resolution
|>
|>
|> I'm interested in better understanding where the stakeholders are on
|> different perspectives: for instance, if the registry model  for TLDs are
|> based on "not for profit" models/assumptions, and the competition
|> essentially begins with the registrars,who are all allowed to (if
|> accredited) to register in all ICANN accredited registries), then the number
|> of registrations in a particular registry is less relevant, it seems to me.
|> There has to be some mechanism to prevent price gouging, etc. in this model.
|> Otherwise, we'd see bad practices at the registry level, such as charging
|> different prices for different names to the registrars, who would pass that
|> along to the user.  Competition among registry/TLDs doesn't seem to be quite
|> the full answer.

I see the structure having a fixed price across all Registies, fixed by ICANN.
There may be some diversity between TLD's to increase usage but personally I
would prefer to have a standard price across all.  I see it as a funding
mechanism for ICANN and for development.  The current price is $6 USD per
domain.  I would like to see it set at $4 USD.  $1 going directly to ICANN, $1
going into a fund for research and development, the other $2 to remain with the
Registry for operating costs and associated development.  There would not be any
competition between Registries aside from promotion of the TLD they operate.

|> Some may disagree with me, but in fact, over time, some TLDs are likely to
|> be more "used" than others.  There are a lot of factors to consider in how
|> that evolves.  And, some TLDs may be (unfortunately) primarily/initially
|> filled with duplicate registrations from .com, since defensive registrations
|> will be necessary to avoid consumer confusion, fraud, and trademark
|> dilution.  I see no relief from that in some TLDS.

We will continue to see the defensive registrations until such time as the TLD's
become more numerous and diverse.  Each TLD also needs specific guidelines as to
what type of registrations are permitted.    There will always be some TLD's
with limited numbers of registrations.  One of the reasons I wish to see the
Registries operated by non-commercial interest.  Otherwise we will only ever
have TLD's with a high commercial value associated with them.

|> We'll have to wait and see if in fact, new registrations dominate, or if the
|> space is largely defensive registrations.

I believe the defensive registrations will drop off once the name space occupies
a larger turf.

|> As new services evolve, and directories become more useable/available,
|> perhaps we'll see a move to more "friendly" names (longer, complete words,
|> etc.)  That may also create new forms of expansion of the name space.

I see such directories etc as being another layer on top of the DNS.

|> However, in the meantime, of interest, and note, in fact, the present
|> approach in ICANN seems to also support the concept of "niche" TLDs, that
|> is, those who are likely to have a limited, but important group of potential
|> registrants, such as in .museum, for instance.  This concept seems to serve
|> the stakeholders by logical expansion of the name space, for stability,
|> usability, and minimized confusion by users, rather than to focus on
|> creating a registry as a money making endeavor for itself.

I see value in such niche TLD's.  The whole purpose of the DNS is to make our
lives easier and make finding what we are after less painless.  It is not as has
been the case recently, for commercial interests to gain large financial
benefits.

|> Treating a registry/TLD as a limited resource, somewhat like spectrum, seems
|> to be consistent with the ccTLDs' practices, (or most of them).
|>
|> I don't really see how registry "competition" can work, in short.  But if
|> someone can describe their vision, I'm willing to listen.

I see the Registries as being Internet resources.  I do not see any need for
competition at that level.  If anything, competition at the Registry level has a
number of disadvantages.  Mainly being the involvement of commercial interests
who are primarily interested in maintaining high profit centers.

Darryl (Dassa) Lynch.

- --
This message was passed to you via the [email-masked] list.
Send mail to [email-masked] to unsubscribe
("unsubscribe ga" in the body of the message).
Archives at http://www.dnso.org/archives.html

------------------------------

End of GA-DIGEST V1 #289
************************