Subject: GA-DIGEST V1 #1106
From: [email-masked] (GA-DIGEST)
To: [email-masked]

GA-DIGEST          Wednesday, March 27 2002          Volume 01 : Number 1106

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2002 20:08:24 -0500
From: "Cade,Marilyn S - LGA" <[email-masked]>
Subject: RE: [ga] Request for a Working Group

perhaps ICANN's role is to publish the list of external/approprite  contact
information in easily accessible format -- ??? 

- -----Original Message-----
From: Michael Froomkin - U.Miami School of Law
[mailto:[email-masked]]
Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2002 12:11 PM
To: [email-masked]
Cc: [email-masked]
Subject: Re: [ga] Request for a Working Group

[cc's chopped ruthlessly]

Personally, I believe that deceptive trade practices should be regulated
by the national authorities where a business is located and where it
trades, not by ICANN.

On Tue, 26 Mar 2002 [email-masked] wrote:

> Having reviewed the many ICANN Public Forums, the registrars list, and the
GA 
> list, one fact is eminently clear:  the public has been loudly complaining

> about abusive and deceptive registrar and re-seller business practices.
It 
> is apparent to me that there are a sufficient number of rogues in this 
> industry that need to be brought under control.  It is time to review the 
> enforcement provisions within current ICANN contracts, to review how 
> enforcement is currently being handled, and to hold registrars accountable

> for the actions of their resellers.
> 
> I would ask the Chair of this Assembly to convene a working group devoted
to 
> this topic.
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> 

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U. Miami School of Law, P.O. Box 248087, Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA
+1 (305) 284-4285  |  +1 (305) 284-6506 (fax)  |  http://www.law.tm
                        -->It's warm here.<--

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Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2002 20:17:51 -0500 (EST)
From: "Michael Froomkin - U.Miami School of Law" <[email-masked]>
Subject: RE: [ga] Request for a Working Group

That seems very, very sensible.  

[I think I'm at the posting limit, so I'm done for now.]

On Tue, 26 Mar 2002, Cade,Marilyn S - LGA wrote:

> perhaps ICANN's role is to publish the list of external/approprite  contact
> information in easily accessible format -- ??? 
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Michael Froomkin - U.Miami School of Law
> [mailto:[email-masked]]
> Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2002 12:11 PM
> To: [email-masked]
> Cc: [email-masked]
> Subject: Re: [ga] Request for a Working Group
> 
> 
> [cc's chopped ruthlessly]
> 
> Personally, I believe that deceptive trade practices should be regulated
> by the national authorities where a business is located and where it
> trades, not by ICANN.
> 
> On Tue, 26 Mar 2002 [email-masked] wrote:
> 
> > Having reviewed the many ICANN Public Forums, the registrars list, and the
> GA 
> > list, one fact is eminently clear:  the public has been loudly complaining
> 
> > about abusive and deceptive registrar and re-seller business practices.
> It 
> > is apparent to me that there are a sufficient number of rogues in this 
> > industry that need to be brought under control.  It is time to review the 
> > enforcement provisions within current ICANN contracts, to review how 
> > enforcement is currently being handled, and to hold registrars accountable
> 
> > for the actions of their resellers.
> > 
> > I would ask the Chair of this Assembly to convene a working group devoted
> to 
> > this topic.
> > --
> > This message was passed to you via the [email-masked] list.
> > Send mail to [email-masked] to unsubscribe
> > ("unsubscribe ga-full" in the body of the message).
> > Archives at http://www.dnso.org/archives.html
> > 
> > 
> 
> 

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		Please visit http://www.icannwatch.org
A. Michael Froomkin   |    Professor of Law    |   [email-masked]
U. Miami School of Law, P.O. Box 248087, Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA
+1 (305) 284-4285  |  +1 (305) 284-6506 (fax)  |  http://www.law.tm
                        -->It's warm here.<--

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------------------------------

Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2002 20:27:33 -0500
From: "Johnson, David" <[email-masked]>
Subject: [ga] RE: Consensus on consensus?

Any restructing plan must deal with the problem of the tyranny of the
majority (or even supermajority).
In a governmental structure, this might be handled by creating certain
"rights" -- e.g., against "takings" or inequitable treatment.
It's precisely the absence of such protections in the context of a private
ICANN that gives rise to the need to construct a documented consensus,
rather than just counting votes. (Even the votes of every individual
participant, as Danny suggests, because even that doesn't confer legitimacy
when the individual participants are self-selected and don't necessarily
bear the burdens of the rules they collectively make.)

I'm sorry to sound like a broken record on this, but ICANN's powers must be
based on the "consent of the governed" -- and that requires that those
required to follow the rules (and impacted by the rules) must agree to abide
by them. For future rules, this inevitably means a "bargain" in which those
signing up to follow ICANN's regime agree not to be irrational holdouts --
but it simply cannot realistically lead to a regime in which those who might
be bound by the rules agree to the outcome of a board resolution, or an at
large vote, no matter what it might be, no matter how inequitably the
burdens are distributed, etc.

I acknowledge that very few in the ICANN process have seemed to "get" the
idea of consensus (and that the idea has been much abused by false claims
regarding its existence). And I agree with those who have suggested the
value of some more formal (and open) processes to generate a record that an
IRP could uphold. But all of the plans that have suggested re-jiggering
board seats to create an authority that simply legislate rules ... miss the
point ... and make the same mistake that the ICANN Board made in Singapore.

For those who argue that consensus has failed because it's too hard to get a
consensus on many issues, I must respond that: "you don't get it!" The point
is NOT to make rules where there is substantial, principled disagreement
from those with a stake. The point is to NOT make rules where there is such
disagreement. (And to allow, in effect, local option.)

Democracy is not the answer here. Because there is no way to define a
satisfactory "demos" -- an engaged citizenry consisting of most of those
affected by the rule making institutions.

I personally think there is a way to shrink ICANN's mission back to the
(still formidable) task of attempting to catalyze agreement on global issues
that require coordination. The route mapped by too many of the "reform"
proposals leads to creation of a global regulator that might be more
"effective" but that would lack any claim to legitimacy based on "consent of
the governed" -- in the sense that the welfare and goals of those affected
by the rules would govern what rules are made. A much more promising route,
in my view, is to introduce real competition at the registry level so that
the competition between diverse rule sets (as adopted by registries) can
allow the market to provide the voice for the "governed" to be heard. That's
why it is important not to allow the development of objective minimum
qualifications for new TLDs to slip off the agenda. And that's why those
calling for reform, in various ways, need to think outside the box of
traditional regulation and legislation -- and ask themselves when those
voluntarily connecting to an inter-network should (and will) agree to abide
(in the unforeseeable future) by policies with which they don't happen to
agree at the time.

The basic bargain that gave rise to ICANN was not (1) a delegation of power
from the USG, (2) a conspiracy among a technical elite, or (3) an upwelling
of virtual nation building by netizens. It was, instead, the shared view
that everyone involved in the dns ought to be willing not to "hold out" for
selfish advantage if most of those similarly situated and similarly affected
were willing to go along with the general view that a global rule is needed.
That's the deal. It's not about voting (though some voting might be useful
to most the discussion along). It's not about empowering a new regulatory
structure. It's about talking (hopefully, mostly, online) until we can
figure out what most of those involved DO agree upon. It's about...
consensus.

- -----Original Message-----
From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]]
Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2002 8:05 PM
To: [email-masked]
Cc: [email-masked]
Subject: Consensus on consensus?

Karl Auerbach in his "Prescription-to-Promote" has argued that:  "The
concept 
of "consensus" must be discarded", with all decisions to be based on counted

voting using clearly defined procedures such as Robert's Rules.   Stuart
Lynn 
has likewise argued that a private sector body, based on consensus and 
consent, has been shown to be impractical.  

This begs the question... is it time to replace the consensus process?  If 
so, how do we avoid establishing a structural model that relegates certain 
groups automatically to minority status?   ICANN seems to be enamoured with 
voting blocks... Can we move to a one-man/one-vote mechanism, and will such
a 
move be accompanied with full membership rights for all participants?  

ICANN doesn't have the greatest track record with respect to honoring 
consensus... can we expect it to honor an actual vote of the complete 
membership?  More questions than answers at this point...

for Karl's treatise, see:  
http://www.cavebear.com/rw/prescription-to-promote.pdf

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------------------------------

Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2002 17:49:02 -0800 (PST)
From: Karl Auerbach <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: [ga] Consensus on consensus?

On Tue, 26 Mar 2002 [email-masked] wrote:

> This begs the question... is it time to replace the consensus process?  If 
> so, how do we avoid establishing a structural model that relegates certain 
> groups automatically to minority status?

Let's break that down into a bit more detail.

I'd being by suggesting that the presence of minorities is not a bad thing 
in and of itself.

What is bad are systems in which one is assigned by some external metric 
or authority into a given voting bloc.  That is what I find troublesome 
with ICANN's notion of "stakeholders" - it is a simpleminded assignment of 
people/entities to a voting bloc (or to observer status) based on one 
external attribute.

To my mind, a better approach is to designate some "atomic unit" of voting
- - I generally use the single individual as this atomic unit - and let
those units chose for themselves which other units they wish to be
associated on any particular issue.  In other words, I suggest that there
be no concept of "stakeholder" and instead there be simply the fluid and
free association (and dis-association) of people with one another based on
how each perceives his or her interests.

Thus someone may be in a minority on issue A and be in the majority on
issue B.  (For instance, despite my reputation as a dissident, I have been
in the majority on many, perhaps most, of the ICANN Board of Director
votes in which I have participated. ;-)

Fluid association is a system that encourages compromise - albeit perhaps
by its less felicitious name, politiking.

There are those who will object to what I am proposing.  They will assert 
that there entities, such as ISP's or DNS registries that have a greater 
"stake" in the decisions.

I don't agree with the assertion of "greater stake".  I do agree that
there are those with a more direct economic relationship - an ICANN
decision may have a very direct relationship with the income that a
registry receives.  But I don't see that as necessarily any greater
"stake" than the cumulative "stake" as measured by the indirect charges
that fall on those who use and pay for domain name services or even as
measured by the perceived "stability" of things like e-commerce by those
who merely use the Internet.

In addition we can look to our experience here in the United States, a
country in which the voters in most of our public elections are people and
not corporations or other collective entities.  Here in the US, despite 
the fact that the actual votes are in the hands of individual people, 
there is still no doubt that collective entities make their desires known.  
Indeed the problem is not that these collective entities are ignorred but, 
rather, that they have too much influence even though they do not 
themselves possess a vote.

		--karl--

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------------------------------

Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2002 21:36:23 -0500
From: Joanna Lane <[email-masked]>
Subject: RE: [ga] RE: Consensus on consensus?

David,
William S Lovell PhD and myself have been developing a concrete consensus
building mechanism suitable for this situation for a while, copies of which
can be reviewed at:-
http://www.cerebalaw.com/BPIial.htm
http://www.cerebalaw.com/BPIIial.pdf
http://www.cerebalaw.com/BPIIIial.htm
http://www.cerebalaw.com/BPIVial.htm

This project was originally conceived for use by the GA, then was submitted
to the ALSC in response to the call in their interim report for concrete
consensus building mechanisms for the At Large. More recently, it has been
submitted to the CDT in response to their call for online procedures. The
next step is to commence a case study, which has been slated for the
Icannatlarge.com website, where a special section has already been set
aside. http://www.icannatlarge.com/forum/viewforum.php?f=10

Please join us in developing this vital tool for effective participation in
the ICANN process.
In the meantime, all comments, both on or offlist, would be much
appreciated.

Regards,
Joanna

- -----Original Message-----
From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]]On Behalf Of Johnson,
David
Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2002 8:28 PM
To: [email-masked]'; [email-masked]
Cc: Johnson, David
Subject: [ga] RE: Consensus on consensus?

Any restructing plan must deal with the problem of the tyranny of the
majority (or even supermajority).
In a governmental structure, this might be handled by creating certain
"rights" -- e.g., against "takings" or inequitable treatment.
It's precisely the absence of such protections in the context of a private
ICANN that gives rise to the need to construct a documented consensus,
rather than just counting votes. (Even the votes of every individual
participant, as Danny suggests, because even that doesn't confer legitimacy
when the individual participants are self-selected and don't necessarily
bear the burdens of the rules they collectively make.)

I'm sorry to sound like a broken record on this, but ICANN's powers must be
based on the "consent of the governed" -- and that requires that those
required to follow the rules (and impacted by the rules) must agree to abide
by them. For future rules, this inevitably means a "bargain" in which those
signing up to follow ICANN's regime agree not to be irrational holdouts --
but it simply cannot realistically lead to a regime in which those who might
be bound by the rules agree to the outcome of a board resolution, or an at
large vote, no matter what it might be, no matter how inequitably the
burdens are distributed, etc.

I acknowledge that very few in the ICANN process have seemed to "get" the
idea of consensus (and that the idea has been much abused by false claims
regarding its existence). And I agree with those who have suggested the
value of some more formal (and open) processes to generate a record that an
IRP could uphold. But all of the plans that have suggested re-jiggering
board seats to create an authority that simply legislate rules ... miss the
point ... and make the same mistake that the ICANN Board made in Singapore.

For those who argue that consensus has failed because it's too hard to get a
consensus on many issues, I must respond that: "you don't get it!" The point
is NOT to make rules where there is substantial, principled disagreement
from those with a stake. The point is to NOT make rules where there is such
disagreement. (And to allow, in effect, local option.)

Democracy is not the answer here. Because there is no way to define a
satisfactory "demos" -- an engaged citizenry consisting of most of those
affected by the rule making institutions.

I personally think there is a way to shrink ICANN's mission back to the
(still formidable) task of attempting to catalyze agreement on global issues
that require coordination. The route mapped by too many of the "reform"
proposals leads to creation of a global regulator that might be more
"effective" but that would lack any claim to legitimacy based on "consent of
the governed" -- in the sense that the welfare and goals of those affected
by the rules would govern what rules are made. A much more promising route,
in my view, is to introduce real competition at the registry level so that
the competition between diverse rule sets (as adopted by registries) can
allow the market to provide the voice for the "governed" to be heard. That's
why it is important not to allow the development of objective minimum
qualifications for new TLDs to slip off the agenda. And that's why those
calling for reform, in various ways, need to think outside the box of
traditional regulation and legislation -- and ask themselves when those
voluntarily connecting to an inter-network should (and will) agree to abide
(in the unforeseeable future) by policies with which they don't happen to
agree at the time.

The basic bargain that gave rise to ICANN was not (1) a delegation of power
from the USG, (2) a conspiracy among a technical elite, or (3) an upwelling
of virtual nation building by netizens. It was, instead, the shared view
that everyone involved in the dns ought to be willing not to "hold out" for
selfish advantage if most of those similarly situated and similarly affected
were willing to go along with the general view that a global rule is needed.
That's the deal. It's not about voting (though some voting might be useful
to most the discussion along). It's not about empowering a new regulatory
structure. It's about talking (hopefully, mostly, online) until we can
figure out what most of those involved DO agree upon. It's about...
consensus.

- -----Original Message-----
From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]]
Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2002 8:05 PM
To: [email-masked]
Cc: [email-masked]
Subject: Consensus on consensus?

Karl Auerbach in his "Prescription-to-Promote" has argued that:  "The
concept
of "consensus" must be discarded", with all decisions to be based on counted

voting using clearly defined procedures such as Robert's Rules.   Stuart
Lynn
has likewise argued that a private sector body, based on consensus and
consent, has been shown to be impractical.

This begs the question... is it time to replace the consensus process?  If
so, how do we avoid establishing a structural model that relegates certain
groups automatically to minority status?   ICANN seems to be enamoured with
voting blocks... Can we move to a one-man/one-vote mechanism, and will such
a
move be accompanied with full membership rights for all participants?

ICANN doesn't have the greatest track record with respect to honoring
consensus... can we expect it to honor an actual vote of the complete
membership?  More questions than answers at this point...

for Karl's treatise, see:
http://www.cavebear.com/rw/prescription-to-promote.pdf

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------------------------------

Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2002 19:38:48 -0800
From: William X Walsh <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: [ga] Re: anyone notice fallout from this?

Spam spam spam.

Please keep it off the [email-masked] list.

Tuesday, Tuesday, March 26, 2002, 3:47:48 PM, [email-masked] wrote:

> In the dotPRO namespace there will be no colliders if all Registrants register with http://nic.pro.xs2.net in addition!

> Isn't that a great news!?

> nic.PRO is supported by:
> - Common Interest Network Information Center Society
> - Name.Space
> - Open Root Server Confederation
> - The PacificRoot 

> check here for details:
> http://root-dns.org/VueDig/VueDig_tld.php?tld=nic.pro&record=NS

> Best regards,
> Simon

> http://nic.pro.xs2.net
> nic.PRO - the original .PRO third level domain registry!

>> ----- Original Message -----
>> From: 'John R. LoVerso' <[email-masked]>
>> To: <[email-masked]>
>> Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2002 3:26 PM
>> Subject: anyone notice fallout from this?
>> > ------- Start of forwarded message -------
>> > This document describes the 'Root Fix for the .US Top Level Domain'.  Root
>> > Fix is a series of actions taken by the Open Root Server Confederation
>> > (ORSC) to prevent the destabilization of the DNS due to ICANN's
>> > introduction of colliding top level domains.  This document describes the
>> > actions taken bythe ORSC to remedy the collateral damage that has been
>> > directly caused to the .US top level domain in non-ICANN root systems.
>> >
>> > A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
>> >
>> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-higgs-schneiders-root-fix-us-00.tx
>> t
>> > ------- End of forwarded message -------
>> Lets get something straight.
>> 1. ORSC and Inclusive Namespace roots did not cause this problem, Neustar
>> did
>> by deliberatly moving the .US nameservers under BIZ.
>> 2. ICANN's versionof .BIZ is the collider.
>> No damage has been done that hasn't already been fixed.
>> John
>> ---
>> AGN Domain Name Services
>> http://www.adns.net
>> Censorship-Free GA list: http://dns-o.org/listinfo/ga
>> --
>> This message was passed to you via the [email-masked] list.
>> Send mail to [email-masked] to unsubscribe
>> ('unsubscribe ga' in the body of the message).
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Best regards,
William X Walsh <[email-masked]>
- --
Save Internet Radio!  
CARP will kill Webcasting!
http://www.saveinternetradio.org/

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------------------------------

Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2002 22:53:00 -0800
From: "William S. Lovell" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: [ga] Consensus on consensus?

- --------------F1ED66638AF082AC6AD1B078
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

> consent, has been shown to be impractical.

Danny, etc.:

I've reviewed Karl's "Prescription-to-Promote" email, and I must say
that he is, for once, uncharacteristically dead wrong -- and evidently
joins Stuart Lynn in being so. As to Stuart Lynn, it has been proven
to be unworkable in ICANN because ICANN has never had the
slightest idea what a "consensus" really is.  As to Karl and Robert's
Rules of Order, if you read http://www.cerebalaw.com/BPIial.htm,
you will find my basis for those assertions, i.e., the "Bible" on reaching
consensus, which makes two points:

1) "consensus" means that everybody has reached agreement;
2) Robert's Rules of Order are designed for organizations that
have (a) continuity; and (2) an institutional memory.
Anything on line lacks both of those, not to mention the fact that
Robert's Rules are cluttered with so much procedural glop --
"Point of Order, Mr. Chairman!" -- so that, exactly the way in which
[email-masked] has worked for years, nothing substantive ever gets
done, and there is only endless hassle over procedural niceties. Does
any of this ring a bell with anyone?

1) is impossible, you say?  icannatlarge.com has managed to reach
consensus on a whole range of things so far, and "never was heard,
a discouraging word, and the skies were not cloudy all day." We'll
have the first election finished by mid-April -- it's an "attitude" kind
of thing that would only suffer from piling on procedural niceties.

(I might add that Karl's summation of the nature of ICANN is dead
right -- it is his solutions with which I disagree.)

(Another parenthetical as to the comment below that "ICANN doesn't
have the greatest track record with respect to honoring consensus": it
has never honored one because it has never seen one, at least any
that ever came out of [email-masked].)

Fact is, there are ways to reach consensus in an on-line environment
and a first shot at trying to define such a way can be found at:

http://www.cerebalaw.com/BPIial.htm
http://www.cerebalaw.com/BPIIial.pdf
http://www.cerebalaw.com/BPIIIial.htm
http://www.cerebalaw.com/BPIVial.htm

About in mid-April, this system is set to have its first try-out at
http://www.icannatlarge.com, and you are all invited to vet it
out.

Bill Lovell

[email-masked] wrote:

> Karl Auerbach in his "Prescription-to-Promote" has argued that:  "The concept
> of "consensus" must be discarded", with all decisions to be based on counted
> voting using clearly defined procedures such as Robert's Rules.   Stuart Lynn
> has likewise argued that a private sector body, based on consensus and
> consent, has been shown to be impractical.
>
> This begs the question... is it time to replace the consensus process?  If
> so, how do we avoid establishing a structural model that relegates certain
> groups automatically to minority status?   ICANN seems to be enamoured with
> voting blocks... Can we move to a one-man/one-vote mechanism, and will such a
> move be accompanied with full membership rights for all participants?
>
> ICANN doesn't have the greatest track record with respect to honoring
> consensus... can we expect it to honor an actual vote of the complete
> membership?  More questions than answers at this point...
>
> for Karl's treatise, see:
> http://www.cavebear.com/rw/prescription-to-promote.pdf
>
> --
> This message was passed to you via the [email-masked] list.
> Send mail to [email-masked] to unsubscribe
> ("unsubscribe ga" in the body of the message).
> Archives at http://www.dnso.org/archives.html

- --------------F1ED66638AF082AC6AD1B078
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<!doctype html public "-//w3c//dtd html 4.0 transitional//en">
<html>

<blockquote TYPE=CITE>consent, has been shown to be impractical.</blockquote>
Danny, etc.:
<p>I've reviewed Karl's "Prescription-to-Promote" email, and I must say
<br>that he is, for once, uncharacteristically dead wrong -- and evidently
<br>joins Stuart Lynn in being so. As to Stuart Lynn, it has been proven
<br>to be unworkable in ICANN because ICANN has never had the
<br>slightest idea what a "consensus" really is.&nbsp; As to Karl and Robert's
<br>Rules of Order, if you read <A HREF="http://www.cerebalaw.com/BPIial.htm">http://www.cerebalaw.com/BPIial.htm</A>,
<br>you will find my basis for those assertions, i.e., the "Bible" on reaching
<br>consensus, which makes two points:
<p>1) "consensus" means that everybody has reached agreement;
<br>2) Robert's Rules of Order are designed for organizations that
<br>have (a) continuity; and (2) an institutional memory.
<br>Anything on line lacks both of those, not to mention the fact that
<br>Robert's Rules are cluttered with so much procedural glop --
<br>"Point of Order, Mr. Chairman!" -- so that, <b>exactly the way in which</b>
<br><b>[email-masked] has worked for years</b>, nothing substantive <b>ever</b>
gets
<br>done, and there is only endless hassle over procedural niceties. Does
<br>any of this ring a bell with anyone?
<p>1) is impossible, you say?&nbsp; icannatlarge.com has managed to reach
<br>consensus on a whole range of things so far, and "never was heard,
<br>a discouraging word, and the skies were not cloudy all day." We'll
<br>have the first election finished by mid-April -- it's an "attitude"
kind
<br>of thing that would only suffer from piling on procedural niceties.
<p>(I might add that Karl's summation of the nature of ICANN is dead
<br><b>right</b> -- it is his solutions with which I disagree.)
<p>(Another parenthetical as to the comment below that "ICANN doesn't
<br>have the greatest track record with respect to honoring consensus":
it
<br>has never honored one because it has never seen one, at least any
<br>that ever came out of [email-masked].)
<p>Fact is, there <i>are</i> ways to reach consensus in an on-line environment
<br>and a first shot at trying to define such a way can be found at:
<p><A HREF="http://www.cerebalaw.com/BPIial.htm">http://www.cerebalaw.com/BPIial.htm</A>
<br><A HREF="http://www.cerebalaw.com/BPIIial.pdf">http://www.cerebalaw.com/BPIIial.pdf</A>
<br><A HREF="http://www.cerebalaw.com/BPIIIial.htm">http://www.cerebalaw.com/BPIIIial.htm</A>
<br><A HREF="http://www.cerebalaw.com/BPIVial.htm">http://www.cerebalaw.com/BPIVial.htm</A>
<p>About in mid-April, this system is set to have its first try-out at
<br><A HREF="http://www.icannatlarge.com">http://www.icannatlarge.com</A>, and you are all invited to vet it
<br>out.
<p>Bill Lovell
<br>&nbsp;
<p>[email-masked] wrote:
<blockquote TYPE=CITE>Karl Auerbach in his "Prescription-to-Promote" has
argued that:&nbsp; "The concept
<br>of "consensus" must be discarded", with all decisions to be based on
counted
<br>voting using clearly defined procedures such as Robert's Rules.&nbsp;&nbsp;
Stuart Lynn
<br>has likewise argued that a private sector body, based on consensus
and
<br>consent, has been shown to be impractical.
<p>This begs the question... is it time to replace the consensus process?&nbsp;
If
<br>so, how do we avoid establishing a structural model that relegates
certain
<br>groups automatically to minority status?&nbsp;&nbsp; ICANN seems to
be enamoured with
<br>voting blocks... Can we move to a one-man/one-vote mechanism, and will
such a
<br>move be accompanied with full membership rights for all participants?
<p>ICANN doesn't have the greatest track record with respect to honoring
<br>consensus... can we expect it to honor an actual vote of the complete
<br>membership?&nbsp; More questions than answers at this point...
<p>for Karl's treatise, see:
<br><a href="http://www.cavebear.com/rw/prescription-to-promote.pdf">http://www.cavebear.com/rw/prescription-to-promote.pdf</a>
<p>--
<br>This message was passed to you via the [email-masked] list.
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<br>("unsubscribe ga" in the body of the message).
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Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2002 23:07:23 -0800
From: "William S. Lovell" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: [ga] RE: Consensus on consensus?

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David Johnson, I might add, does understand what "consensus" means:
"It's not about empowering a new regulatory structure. It's about talking
(hopefully, mostly, online) until we can figure out what most of those
involved DO agree upon. It's about... consensus."

Bill Lovell

"Johnson, David" wrote:

> Any restructing plan must deal with the problem of the tyranny of the
> majority (or even supermajority).
> In a governmental structure, this might be handled by creating certain
> "rights" -- e.g., against "takings" or inequitable treatment.
> It's precisely the absence of such protections in the context of a private
> ICANN that gives rise to the need to construct a documented consensus,
> rather than just counting votes. (Even the votes of every individual
> participant, as Danny suggests, because even that doesn't confer legitimacy
> when the individual participants are self-selected and don't necessarily
> bear the burdens of the rules they collectively make.)
>
> I'm sorry to sound like a broken record on this, but ICANN's powers must be
> based on the "consent of the governed" -- and that requires that those
> required to follow the rules (and impacted by the rules) must agree to abide
> by them. For future rules, this inevitably means a "bargain" in which those
> signing up to follow ICANN's regime agree not to be irrational holdouts --
> but it simply cannot realistically lead to a regime in which those who might
> be bound by the rules agree to the outcome of a board resolution, or an at
> large vote, no matter what it might be, no matter how inequitably the
> burdens are distributed, etc.
>
> I acknowledge that very few in the ICANN process have seemed to "get" the
> idea of consensus (and that the idea has been much abused by false claims
> regarding its existence). And I agree with those who have suggested the
> value of some more formal (and open) processes to generate a record that an
> IRP could uphold. But all of the plans that have suggested re-jiggering
> board seats to create an authority that simply legislate rules ... miss the
> point ... and make the same mistake that the ICANN Board made in Singapore.
>
> For those who argue that consensus has failed because it's too hard to get a
> consensus on many issues, I must respond that: "you don't get it!" The point
> is NOT to make rules where there is substantial, principled disagreement
> from those with a stake. The point is to NOT make rules where there is such
> disagreement. (And to allow, in effect, local option.)
>
> Democracy is not the answer here. Because there is no way to define a
> satisfactory "demos" -- an engaged citizenry consisting of most of those
> affected by the rule making institutions.
>
> I personally think there is a way to shrink ICANN's mission back to the
> (still formidable) task of attempting to catalyze agreement on global issues
> that require coordination. The route mapped by too many of the "reform"
> proposals leads to creation of a global regulator that might be more
> "effective" but that would lack any claim to legitimacy based on "consent of
> the governed" -- in the sense that the welfare and goals of those affected
> by the rules would govern what rules are made. A much more promising route,
> in my view, is to introduce real competition at the registry level so that
> the competition between diverse rule sets (as adopted by registries) can
> allow the market to provide the voice for the "governed" to be heard. That's
> why it is important not to allow the development of objective minimum
> qualifications for new TLDs to slip off the agenda. And that's why those
> calling for reform, in various ways, need to think outside the box of
> traditional regulation and legislation -- and ask themselves when those
> voluntarily connecting to an inter-network should (and will) agree to abide
> (in the unforeseeable future) by policies with which they don't happen to
> agree at the time.
>
> The basic bargain that gave rise to ICANN was not (1) a delegation of power
> from the USG, (2) a conspiracy among a technical elite, or (3) an upwelling
> of virtual nation building by netizens. It was, instead, the shared view
> that everyone involved in the dns ought to be willing not to "hold out" for
> selfish advantage if most of those similarly situated and similarly affected
> were willing to go along with the general view that a global rule is needed.
> That's the deal. It's not about voting (though some voting might be useful
> to most the discussion along). It's not about empowering a new regulatory
> structure. It's about talking (hopefully, mostly, online) until we can
> figure out what most of those involved DO agree upon. It's about...
> consensus.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]]
> Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2002 8:05 PM
> To: [email-masked]
> Cc: [email-masked]
> Subject: Consensus on consensus?
>
> Karl Auerbach in his "Prescription-to-Promote" has argued that:  "The
> concept
> of "consensus" must be discarded", with all decisions to be based on counted
>
> voting using clearly defined procedures such as Robert's Rules.   Stuart
> Lynn
> has likewise argued that a private sector body, based on consensus and
> consent, has been shown to be impractical.
>
> This begs the question... is it time to replace the consensus process?  If
> so, how do we avoid establishing a structural model that relegates certain
> groups automatically to minority status?   ICANN seems to be enamoured with
> voting blocks... Can we move to a one-man/one-vote mechanism, and will such
> a
> move be accompanied with full membership rights for all participants?
>
> ICANN doesn't have the greatest track record with respect to honoring
> consensus... can we expect it to honor an actual vote of the complete
> membership?  More questions than answers at this point...
>
> for Karl's treatise, see:
> http://www.cavebear.com/rw/prescription-to-promote.pdf
>
> --
> This message was passed to you via the [email-masked] list.
> Send mail to [email-masked] to unsubscribe
> ("unsubscribe ga" in the body of the message).
> Archives at http://www.dnso.org/archives.html

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<!doctype html public "-//w3c//dtd html 4.0 transitional//en">
<html>
David Johnson, I might add, <i>does</i> understand what "consensus" means:
<br>"It's not about empowering a new regulatory structure. It's about talking
<br>(hopefully, mostly, online) until we can figure out what most of those
<br>involved DO agree upon. It's about... consensus."
<p>Bill Lovell
<p>"Johnson, David" wrote:
<blockquote TYPE=CITE>Any restructing plan must deal with the problem of
the tyranny of the
<br>majority (or even supermajority).
<br>In a governmental structure, this might be handled by creating certain
<br>"rights" -- e.g., against "takings" or inequitable treatment.
<br>It's precisely the absence of such protections in the context of a
private
<br>ICANN that gives rise to the need to construct a documented consensus,
<br>rather than just counting votes. (Even the votes of every individual
<br>participant, as Danny suggests, because even that doesn't confer legitimacy
<br>when the individual participants are self-selected and don't necessarily
<br>bear the burdens of the rules they collectively make.)
<p>I'm sorry to sound like a broken record on this, but ICANN's powers
must be
<br>based on the "consent of the governed" -- and that requires that those
<br>required to follow the rules (and impacted by the rules) must agree
to abide
<br>by them. For future rules, this inevitably means a "bargain" in which
those
<br>signing up to follow ICANN's regime agree not to be irrational holdouts
- --
<br>but it simply cannot realistically lead to a regime in which those
who might
<br>be bound by the rules agree to the outcome of a board resolution, or
an at
<br>large vote, no matter what it might be, no matter how inequitably the
<br>burdens are distributed, etc.
<p>I acknowledge that very few in the ICANN process have seemed to "get"
the
<br>idea of consensus (and that the idea has been much abused by false
claims
<br>regarding its existence). And I agree with those who have suggested
the
<br>value of some more formal (and open) processes to generate a record
that an
<br>IRP could uphold. But all of the plans that have suggested re-jiggering
<br>board seats to create an authority that simply legislate rules ...
miss the
<br>point ... and make the same mistake that the ICANN Board made in Singapore.
<p>For those who argue that consensus has failed because it's too hard
to get a
<br>consensus on many issues, I must respond that: "you don't get it!"
The point
<br>is NOT to make rules where there is substantial, principled disagreement
<br>from those with a stake. The point is to NOT make rules where there
is such
<br>disagreement. (And to allow, in effect, local option.)
<p>Democracy is not the answer here. Because there is no way to define
a
<br>satisfactory "demos" -- an engaged citizenry consisting of most of
those
<br>affected by the rule making institutions.
<p>I personally think there is a way to shrink ICANN's mission back to
the
<br>(still formidable) task of attempting to catalyze agreement on global
issues
<br>that require coordination. The route mapped by too many of the "reform"
<br>proposals leads to creation of a global regulator that might be more
<br>"effective" but that would lack any claim to legitimacy based on "consent
of
<br>the governed" -- in the sense that the welfare and goals of those affected
<br>by the rules would govern what rules are made. A much more promising
route,
<br>in my view, is to introduce real competition at the registry level
so that
<br>the competition between diverse rule sets (as adopted by registries)
can
<br>allow the market to provide the voice for the "governed" to be heard.
That's
<br>why it is important not to allow the development of objective minimum
<br>qualifications for new TLDs to slip off the agenda. And that's why
those
<br>calling for reform, in various ways, need to think outside the box
of
<br>traditional regulation and legislation -- and ask themselves when those
<br>voluntarily connecting to an inter-network should (and will) agree
to abide
<br>(in the unforeseeable future) by policies with which they don't happen
to
<br>agree at the time.
<p>The basic bargain that gave rise to ICANN was not (1) a delegation of
power
<br>from the USG, (2) a conspiracy among a technical elite, or (3) an upwelling
<br>of virtual nation building by netizens. It was, instead, the shared
view
<br>that everyone involved in the dns ought to be willing not to "hold
out" for
<br>selfish advantage if most of those similarly situated and similarly
affected
<br>were willing to go along with the general view that a global rule is
needed.
<br>That's the deal. It's not about voting (though some voting might be
useful
<br>to most the discussion along). It's not about empowering a new regulatory
<br>structure. It's about talking (hopefully, mostly, online) until we
can
<br>figure out what most of those involved DO agree upon. It's about...
<br>consensus.
<p>-----Original Message-----
<br>From: [email-masked] [<a href="mailto:[email-masked]">mailto:[email-masked]</a>]
<br>Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2002 8:05 PM
<br>To: [email-masked]
<br>Cc: [email-masked]
<br>Subject: Consensus on consensus?
<p>Karl Auerbach in his "Prescription-to-Promote" has argued that:&nbsp;
"The
<br>concept
<br>of "consensus" must be discarded", with all decisions to be based on
counted
<p>voting using clearly defined procedures such as Robert's Rules.&nbsp;&nbsp;
Stuart
<br>Lynn
<br>has likewise argued that a private sector body, based on consensus
and
<br>consent, has been shown to be impractical.
<p>This begs the question... is it time to replace the consensus process?&nbsp;
If
<br>so, how do we avoid establishing a structural model that relegates
certain
<br>groups automatically to minority status?&nbsp;&nbsp; ICANN seems to
be enamoured with
<br>voting blocks... Can we move to a one-man/one-vote mechanism, and will
such
<br>a
<br>move be accompanied with full membership rights for all participants?
<p>ICANN doesn't have the greatest track record with respect to honoring
<br>consensus... can we expect it to honor an actual vote of the complete
<br>membership?&nbsp; More questions than answers at this point...
<p>for Karl's treatise, see:
<br><a href="http://www.cavebear.com/rw/prescription-to-promote.pdf">http://www.cavebear.com/rw/prescription-to-promote.pdf</a>
<p>--
<br>This message was passed to you via the [email-masked] list.
<br>Send mail to [email-masked] to unsubscribe
<br>("unsubscribe ga" in the body of the message).
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</html>

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